

Arab Class Structure and the New Terrorism

The point which has been almost universally missed in discussing problems about the Palestinians by both friends and enemies of Israel has been the question of Arab Class Conflicts and their relevance to what is presently going on in the Middle East.

Perhaps the reason for this is because such language has become such a fixture of International Communist jargon and because recently it had become such a cliché of vocal "New Left" circles in Western Europe and America. Since such circles are usually anathema to Pro-Oil Lobbies and Capitalistic Friends of Conservative Arab Hierarchies very often hostile to Israel, it is not dealt with by them. Equally, because Israelis themselves and those inclined to Pro-Israeli Sentiment have been so wounded by the treatment Israel has received in the past two decades from the Communist World – whether Russian or Chinese – and the hostility expressed by New Left/National Liberation-Oriented Circles, it has not been discussed by them.

But, when discussing the problem of the Palestinians and particularly the problem of the future of the Occupied Territories, it is extremely relevant. How and in what way? Recently, Moshe Dayan said in an interview in *Newsweek Magazine* after the collapse of Henry Kissinger's first Middle East Shuttle that: if you asked how many people in today's West Bank or Occupied Territories – the very areas Yasser Arafat is always talking about when speaking of the emerging Palestinian State – would want to live in such a State dominated by the P.L.O., the number you would find would be ridiculously small.

Of course, he was saying this jokingly at the time and for its shock value in terms of public opinion, but one could perhaps investigate the problem more seriously. Perhaps the best vantage point from which to approach such a problem is that of Palestinian Arab Terrorism. First of all, what has been striking in the last

eight years since the Six-Day War is not the incidences of Terrorist acts, but the lack of them.

Terrorism was to be expected in the wake of the stunning victory of 1967, the displacement of several hundred thousand more Palestinians, and the takeover of a relatively hostile, alien Arab Population numbering around a million persons in the Areas – euphemistically called by the Israelis Judea and Samaria – and the Gaza Strip. Included in this number also were large segments of Palestinian Refugee Population from the Period of 1948, still unassimilated and to a certain extent still living in separate U.N.-Sponsored Cantonments called “Refugee Camps”. To be sure, “The Camps” around Ramallah, Nablus, and between Hebron and Bethlehem resemble nothing so much as they resemble small Arab Villages, replete with trees, rows of vines, and tv antennae.

The Camps near Jericho were poorer but even these are hardly different from most small Arab Towns in the Sudan or North Africa though they were mostly deserted, the residents having fled across the Jordan after the Six-Day War and have not been reoccupied since. The Gaza Strip is another problem but unchecked Terrorist Activity that seemed to characterize the situation there in the years following the Six-Day War was dealt with by severe Israeli countermeasures in 1971.

What was surprising in all these “Occupied Territories” was the relative lack of Terrorist Activity, not the incidence of it, until The *Yom Kippur* War except for the special case of the Gaza Strip. Even here, Terrorist Activity was mainly directed against other Arabs rather than Israelis. During The *Yom Kippur* War, the most stunning aspect of the Israeli Presence in the Occupied Areas was the almost complete lack of Terrorism and the almost unnatural calm of the local populations – as in Israel proper during The Six-Day War – even though the Conflict was relatively drawn-out as Middle

Eastern Conflicts tend to go and the Israelis at first suffered some disturbing reverses.

What is the explanation for this seeming docility? Are the Arabs in the Occupied Territories not so discontent as everyone seems to think – a situation which has become a cliché for all sophisticated people around the world? Is not Palestinian Nationalism rampant among all Arabs within the Palestinian Culture frame wherever they are to be found?

The Israelis themselves in most cases have not really come to grips with the social processes underlying life on the West Bank and, to a certain extent, the Gaza Strip. If they, who are so close to the problem, have not understood it, then the World at large is not to be blamed to any greater extent for displaying an ignorance the Israelis have been totally delinquent in alleviating.

The Israelis have not come to grips with the problem for two reasons: 1) Despite what the World might think, most Israelis are not too much interested in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip and do not really like very much thinking about the problems. 2) Which is really a function of one, most Israelis – there are always the enlightened few exceptions – just really do not like Arabs very much.

Rightly or wrongly, who can blame them, after four wars and endless years of mutual strife and tension? As a result, they just have not distinguished the fine points of Arab Social Stratifications. The Army, too, which on the whole has done a commendable job of Administration in what could have been a difficult situation, is guilty with a few exceptions of a similar emotional block and so the problem is just not dealt with in any incisive manner. And, if the Arabs are dissatisfied with Israeli Occupation and the Israeli Presence in the various Areas, how is one to explain the almost total calm that prevails?

Perhaps to understand the problem and its fine-points, one should go back to the very inception of the Israeli occupation after the Six-Day War in 1967. At that time, particularly during the years 1968-1970, the question of the Occupied Territories came up time and time again in conversation – whether to keep them, whether to give them back, whether to work out some sort of third *modus vivendi*.

But the impetus behind all these discussions was the problem of Arab Terrorism, as it expressed itself in events like the bombings of the Jerusalem *Supersol*, the *Mahane Yehuda*, the Tel Aviv Bus Station, that then seemed as if it was going to be endemic. But, while all these questions were being hotly debated between Left and Right, Progressive and Non-Progressive, Militarist and Peacenik; it was already clear that the problem of Arab Terrorism (though perhaps not that of the Territories) had solved itself, not superficially for all the World's Media to see but at its core.

The problem of Terrorism in that Period was not solved by the efficiency of the Israeli Security Apparatus, though most Israelis convinced themselves that it was and this was the picture represented in the World's Press – somewhat to the detriment of the Humanity of the Israeli image abroad.

It is clear both from the events leading up to The *Yom Kippur* War and the Arab Terrorist successes that followed it that the Israeli Security Forces and Intelligence Apparatus are not as good as their vaunted image would have led others – and perhaps themselves – to think they were. They are not supermen; they have their weaknesses like everyone else.

Rather, the first wave of Arab Terrorism that followed directly on the end of the Six-Day War was solved by irreversible social factors at work underneath the surface of life in the Occupied Territories. These had prior to the outbreak of The *Yom Kippur* War just become evident beneath the texture of daily life when they had already – to a

certain extent – become obsolete and new factors were taking their place. In as few words as possible, the problem was solved by the economic uplift experienced in the West Bank (and, to a lesser degree, the Gaza Strip where the Terrorist Problem was therefore solved to a correspondingly lesser extent) as a result of being associated with an area of greater and more technological economic advancement.

It was also solved by the sociological spin-offs both as a result of direct economic benefit and competitive response that inevitably followed being associated with a Society of more advanced and progressive social consciousness such as was to be found in Israel. This is not to say that the last-mentioned is by any means adequate for the Twentieth Century.

The Arabs in the New Territories, while not especially happy, were after an initial introductory Period to the Israeli style of Administration, no longer particularly unhappy. Of course, Happiness is not a particularly tangible criterion yet such an adjective is usually applied to the Arabs under Israeli Occupation. But, who in this world is really happy? Were they any happier under King Hussein's Jordan? Probably not.

Is any people in this World particularly "happy"? Are we in America happy? Are the Israelis happy? But which of us could demand more than not being unhappy from our daily state of affairs? None of us is particularly happy about the problems in his individual environment. The fact that the Israelis could satisfy this last requirement, i.e., for the General Mass of the Population, not being unhappy was no mean achievement. This is why terrorism ceased, for all intents and purposes, in the years following the Six-Day War – this, together with the Jordan Legion's treatment of their Arab Brethren on the other side of the Jordan in the wake of the confrontations with the Terrorist Organizations in 1970.

The Arabs under Israeli Hegemony suddenly realized that, despite its peculiarities, life was more pleasant, more secure, and economically more beneficial on their side of the River than anything they could expect on the other. Of course, this last point was altered to a certain extent by the very significant events of The 1973 War. The Economy of the West Bank and, by implication, the Gaza Strip with the right corrective factors began to boom along with the Israeli Economy – which, prior to the Six-Day War, had been in the doldrums – and the two Economies became more or less inextricably entwined. But most of all it was the Arab Lower Classes which benefited from the connection with the relatively more-advanced Israeli Society or, to employ another generally popular term, "the People" – not the Upper-Class.

But who are "the People" in the Arab World? The phrase is used so often and tossed around so loosely that it is a very difficult quantity to get ahold of. Certainly it is not "the People" who are represented by the Arab Press or the majority of the Arab Governments. It is not even clear it is the People, were they ever queried, who are being represented by the Palestine Liberation Movement.

"The People" is a very elusive thing in the Arab World and, except for those rare moments when emotion boils over – such as during Nasser's Funeral or in the build-up to the Six-Day War or when Nixon visited Cairo (whether manufactured or real) or during Umm Kulthum's Funeral – it is usually sullen and uncommunicative. It has no voice simply because on the whole it is uneducated. Owing to the almost Classical Class Patterns and Orientation of the whole Arab World, it is totally subservient either to the will of the Upper or Upper Middle Classes (pitifully small minorities or elites even in relatively urbanized Lebanon), the Religious Superstructure composed of *Kadis*, *Muftis*, or local Priests and Archbishops that are

generally referred to even in present-day Israel as "the Notables" and in the Countryside or Desert – the local *Muhtar* or Tribal Hierarchy.

But, while unrepresented by any voice validly speaking for them and often silent, the People have a different manner of voting. They vote with their feet – for instance, they run away or they choose to work in one place rather than another – or by their behavior, rebellious or docile, sullen or relatively calm.

In the days between the two Wars in Israel and the Occupied Territories, it was almost impossible for an upper-class, *effendi*-status individual to get an Arab worker to work for him. Of course, this cannot be proved by any meaningful statistics; statistics prove very little. One either has to accept the word of eye-witness reportage or leave the problem as unanswerable. The present writer lived and worked on the West Bank and in Israel from the years 1968-1973. They had all gone across the old "Green Line" into Israel to work. When there were periods of slowness in Israel or when they were laid off, then they worked for their former upper-class, Arab employers – but for highly-inflated wages.

But without workers to dig a garden all day in the hot sun for a pittance wage and a cup of tea or to do all manner of household service or carpentry, plumbing, and car repair; then there can be no Class System in the sense previously enjoyed by the elites of the Arab World. Perhaps this is not the case in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Gulf States where money flows in abundance, but it is still the case everywhere else.

The Class System had broken down. The Arab Upper Class is demonstrably incapable of doing anything with its hands, simply because to do anything yourself with your hands is immediately a sign that you are no longer a part of the Upper Class. For instance, if a man were to go outside and wash his car by himself while a host of

young urchins or otherwise unemployed persons stood by watching, it would be a neighborhood scandal. Such a System depends upon a vast supply of cheap labor to sustain it but, with the appearance of Israel on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, that System was no longer sustainable. Where it was, it was only sustainable at an exorbitant wage. The People of the West Bank, though they could not by any means be called content, were not discontent.

To give some examples: a carpenter or plumber who before the Six-Day War might have been making the equivalent of 2-300 Israeli Pounds a month was now making anywhere from 1000-2000 pounds a month depending on how much advantage he took of the endless moonlighting opportunities open to him. Whereas before his employment was often seasonal – building to a large extent went on in the good weather only as did many other professions – he was now in demand on both sides of the Green Line without regard to seasons. Whereas before he could safely be categorized as a member of the Lower Class – if such a Class existed at all outside the Master/Serf Relationship – his social prestige had now skyrocketed.

The same can be said for drivers or mechanics or other types of skilled hand-laborers. A night-desk clerk in a hotel, who doubled or tripled as a room-service/shoeshine boy and general handyman and made the equivalent of 100-200 Israeli Pounds a month before the War, was now making between 300-400 pounds a month – not including tips.

But in addition to this, there was the affect of the more advanced Israeli social legislation which, for all intents and purposes, was non-existent in the Arab Environment previously. This operated both in a direct sense for workers working in Israel or living in Israeli-Annexed Areas like East Jerusalem, or indirectly through a process of induction, i.e., people experience one set of living conditions by working in one environment and making similar demands in the other.

Take the night-desk clerk for instance. Before the War he could be and often was laid off without notice when business was slow and without severance pay or he could simply be told to stay home for a few weeks because there were no tourists in the hotel. Either direct intervention by the *Histadrut* (The Israel Labor Federation) or indirect threats had made it impossible for the hotel owner to lay him off anymore simply because of ups and downs in the tourist trade – a seasonable endeavor at best – without compensation or severance pay.

For the first time in their lives, Arab workers working in Israel or at *Histadrut*-organized enterprises in East Jerusalem were given vacations – a thing hitherto unknown. As a spin-off, Arab workers still working in the Occupied Territories began to demand or, at least, yearn for the same benefits themselves – a process that could not fail to upset the relationship between Upper and Lower Classes. Members from the Arab Lower Class in the Occupied Territories were traveling for the first time in their lives for pleasure and being accepted as equals in the process. They could be seen on bus trips taking them around Israel, usually at the baths at *Sahneh* in the Galilee – an instant Arab favorite – or daily in twos or threes on the beaches of Netanya or Tel Aviv or in whole families down at the newly-developed Ein Feshka by the Dead Sea.

Very often, too, their children were traveling on Ministry of Education-sponsored trips from their schools – albeit to get away sometimes from the difficult conditions caused by laxer standards of discipline and shorter classroom hours. When their parents had not been entitled to these attractions through their jobs, they very often tagged along with the children or, when their children came home with glowing reports, undertook to take these voyages by themselves. Mortgages and loans, admittedly at very high rates, became available for the first time to the Lower Classes through

their employment in Israel or *Histadrut* Membership and televisions, refrigerators, and gas cookers burgeoned up everywhere. It was not even an uncommon sight to see one or even two or three new rooms being added to what were obviously Lower-Class dwelling units.

In this sense, Arabs – whether in Israel or the Occupied Territories – were fortunate for, being villagers or living on ancestral land, most of them owned their own property however humble. In the inflated economic scene that developed in the Early Seventies, many Arab workers were actually better off than their Israeli counterparts because their expenses in their home villages or in the Jerusalem suburbs – because of the relatively communal life-style they enjoyed – were actually about half those of an Israeli on a similar wage scale.

This fact was recognized, albeit instinctively by many Israeli workers, which caused a good deal of the grumbling that was evident in the days before The *Yom Kippur* War among the Sephardi segments of the Israeli Working Class. A comment that was not uncommon was: "Look. I fought in the War and he is making as much as me and is better off." Whereas an Israeli had to go home to the terribly inequitable and very-seriously strained Israeli housing situation, the Arab could go back to the relative simplicity of his home village (such were the distances involved in most cases).

The effect of this process and of these benefits is clearly evident in the Galilee where Arab villages long under Israeli Rule are flourishing while Israeli settlements seem very often on the verge of poverty. One has only to drive around the roads of the Upper Galilee to see in the Arab villages new houses everywhere – houses built on stilts or of stone, tv-antennae like pine forests – while the Israeli *Moshavim* (Communal Settlements with Private Property) and new towns all have the atmosphere of disintegration and decline – of dire economic straits.

Chupat-Cholim (i.e., medical) privileges were a natural extension of benefits for persons working in Israel while, perhaps, the most anomalous sight of all could be seen one Thursday a month in East Jerusalem at the Post Office outside of Herod's Gate. Here and at other sites within Annexed Territory, village women lined up to receive their monthly "large family" increments, that is, the subsidization granted by the Israeli Government to encourage large families. Since the Law was administered across-the-board without regard to its intent, the Arabs were quick to seize on any benefits due them and they did not really have to be encouraged to desire large families – it was almost a natural instinct – this in a Country supposedly frightened of being inundated by an Arab Population explosion.

A family of nine or ten children, which is not at all uncommon if one knows East Jerusalem, could count on receiving perhaps IL 400 in benefits a month – almost the amount the average laborer could plan on taking home in the equivalent time. As a result of these factors and in response to these processes, the rejection or acceptance of Israeli Administration separated out among Arabs in the Occupied Territories – whether silently or otherwise – along Class Lines. The Lower Classes, always circumspect in expressing their true feelings as already noted, were for the most part silent but they expressed themselves in other ways.

The key to the security situation in Israel, as it existed before the *Yom Kippur* War, was the plain Arab worker going back and forth daily between Israel and the West Bank and Israel and the Gaza Strip in the tens of thousands. It is perhaps too facile to state that he never had it so good but, to a certain extent, this was true. There was very little bombing and little or no sabotage despite the daily opportunities for such endeavors in the procession of workers back and forth and the large numbers of Israeli and foreign visitors in

the *suks* of the Occupied Territories.

Because of social and customary habits already alluded to, very little accurate information of a concrete nature becomes available as to the real feelings of the Arab Mass – one cannot judge the Arab worker or *fellah* by what he is purported to say but, rather, by what he does. If there had been any real breeding ground for a determined Terrorist Movement on the West Bank and even in the Gaza Strip between the two Wars, then you would have had a situation in Israel in the Early Seventies similar to Northern Ireland or even in Algeria in the Late Fifties.

Northern Ireland is a particularly relevant example for here, as with the Arabs in Palestine, the Catholics are backed by a sympathetic Neighboring Population in Eire in the South – as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan are for the Palestinians. As a result in Northern Ireland the IRA were able to pin down and daily occupy a British Army of about forty thousand men and still do to a certain extent.

But on the West Bank the sympathetic Local Population necessary to sustain an active Guerilla Movement – the "Sea", in the Chinese Communist or Che Guevera sense, needed to swim in – was just not present. The successful assimilation of the Arab worker into the Israeli Economic Structure and the reciprocal effects on the worker on the West Bank and Gaza not working in Israel, but who experienced a corresponding economic uplift in living standards as a result, was the most important single factor in denying this process a chance to develop.

During this same period 1967-1972, the Arab Upper Class in contrast to the Lower Class began feeling more and more alienated from everything Israeli and the Israeli way of life. This curious phenomenon could be witnessed by anyone who had daily intercourse with Arabs in any significant manner. Arabs from the Lower Classes –

workers, waiters, construction workers, garage mechanics, gas station attendants, haulers, people who marketed their produce in the *Suk*, even little children – prided themselves on the little bits of Hebrew they had picked up.

Expressions like "*Shalom Adoni*" ("Hello Friend"), "*Mah-Shlomcha?*" ("How are you"), "*beseder*" ("ok"), etc. became common in street jargon. Yet, if one came into contact with any members of the old Upper Class – landowners, former Jordanian Cabinet Ministers, Judges, lawyers, university graduates, School Superintendents – one found, not only no such knowledge, but even the desire to acquire it was lacking. On the contrary, Israeli speech and behavior patterns, being more or less egalitarian in nature, were considered vulgar and looked upon by them with the utmost revulsion and horror.

It even became a mark of Class itself and being above the common herd to avoid any mention of Israel in conversation or any contact with Israelis or their mannerisms as if the contact itself constituted a kind of social pox. Bus and truckloads of Israelis rode down the streets and highways of the West Bank dressed in meager garb, short pants, negligible blouses, kibbutz work-hats and, when they did dress up, it was often very shabbily reflecting the tightness of their economic circumstances – as behind the Iron Curtain. Their taste, where it existed, tended to the flamboyant or modish. Worst of all they very often cruised by singing – usually rather boisterously and always in Hebrew.

For the Lower-Class Arab, there was something rather fascinating and even enjoyable in this child-like, though admittedly rude, behavior. Certainly they were not offended by it and it even betokened a brave new, wholly different, World. There was the attraction of freedom in it. For the Upper Class it was anathema and reinforced the traditional gap between the two modes of existence that had existed from before the Partition. Certainly, too, for the Lower

Classes – and for the Upper-Class male when he allowed himself the gaze – the sight of so much bare flesh, so youthful, so sun-burned, and so suddenly was even intoxicating.

Not surprisingly, the incidences of rape along the beaches and the back roads (the offenders were not only Arabs, but these did their share) increased quite markedly in Israel from 1968 onwards. Young girls could be encountered hitch-hiking everywhere – soldiers or foreigners and volunteers, the new political situation had suddenly attracted to Israel. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem prostitutes, invariably Jewish, would be the first to admit that some of their best clients were the newly-liberated Arab workers with something of an excess of Israeli Pounds on their hands to spend especially if they were single. These last were not in any way as tight-fisted as their Israeli counterparts – generosity being something of an Arab Custom.

Israelis could be seen blundering through every Arab *Suk* in the Land, talking loudly and quickly in their unmistakably Jewish accents, and addressing every Arab they met in Hebrew. The Lower Classes responded in an almost child-like manner to these salutations and the clear indications implied – though perhaps unintentioned – of equality. After all, their own Upper Classes hardly acknowledged them in anything but a condescending manner. The shopkeepers, on the other hand, gritted their teeth but bore it for the sake of the vastly more lucrative business. The Upper Class, for their part, avoided the stench of the Israeli presence like the plague. Before their very eyes, they could see their old polite and genteel Society, that their fathers had enjoyed and they had known so long, disintegrating.

Of course, it is difficult to distinguish between “Upper” and “Lower Classes” and one is talking as if the two comprise two distinct entities. But without getting into the various stratifications within the groupings themselves, roughly throughout

the whole Middle East except perhaps for the newly-rich and urban Lebanon and Kuwait there are only two main social gradations, Upper Class and Lower Classes. While segments of both of these perhaps do merge into what might be considered a "Middle Class" of sorts, it hardly exists to any degree and, even if it did, it rapidly assimilates itself owing to snob values or just the pressures of controlling large concentrations of Capital into the Upper Class.

It should be remembered that what one is dealing with when considering the Middle East is a Society just emerging from the Feudal Middle Ages. Whatever resemblance to the West there might be is only just beginning. Anyone who has anything, who can afford a bit of leisure or to educate his sons, is automatically "Upper Class" though the gradations within this "Class" are admittedly quite varied for the rest of the People have nothing. These last comprise quite evidently the great majority of the People - "the Mass" so-to-speak from Yemen to Morocco to Afghanistan.

The old Upper Class, the Nashashibis, the Anwar Nuseibahs, the Feudal Aristocracy and Landed Rich, are characterized by a constant hostility to the Israeli Regime despite what they may constrain themselves to say in public pronouncements or what appearances they might have assumed. If nothing else, the old Arab Elite are consummate politicians. School Directors, sons of old respected *Kadis*, Religious Figures would not shy away from asking favors of the Israeli Regime as they would feel their former "Class" Position and present penury entitled them to, but underneath in private there is no doubt they could be characterized as remaining unremittingly hostile to it. The further down the Social Ladder one might go through the various levels of *Nouveau Riche*, the more contacts these people were likely to have had with Israelis either through the hotel or tourist trades or through business relations. Therefore the less hostility there was likely to be, but still it was there.

One might almost make a rule: the more contact, business relations or otherwise, a Palestinian Arab was likely to have with Israelis, the more human factors took over in his relationship with them and the less hostility there was likely to be. But hostility is a Class Characteristic and to renounce it altogether would be to renounce one's entrance card into the Society that went before. Some people still feel that this Society will be resurrected and perhaps they are right. But the people with the absolute least contact with Israelis were the Highest Class of all – the old-time Palestinian Elite (besides exceptions like the political go-between with the Jordanian Government Anwar Nuseibah). As if being thrown into a new set of social circumstances was not enough, this Class suddenly found itself in a situation where its very prerogatives and Class Privileges were being threatened.

These prerogatives and privileges, as has already been noted, were based on a ready supply of cheap labor not on any innate industrial ability or creative talent, most of which had already been bred out. What was innate – at least among the old families – was a command of Arab Culture, Arab Language and Arab Manners, and a written command of fine Arabic that this "Class" alone possessed. In many instances they were deferred to simply on this basis alone and they became Religious and Educational Officials, High Civil Servants as a result of it – Traditions which stayed in the family for generations.

It was particularly this Class which fell on hard times under the Israeli Occupation, not the businessmen or merchants though they too suffered. They were caught between the pincers of a more equitable Israeli Tax Structure that, when it functioned carried everything before it, and their own inability to do anything useful in Modern Terms for work. The trait of 'not wishing to dirty one's hands' was particularly in evidence here and the more Aristocratic they were, the more this was so.

Yet it was just this substratum within the Upper Class that controlled the intellectual life of the Community and through whom the image of Palestinian Opinion was given out to the World. Inevitably, if not also by design, their own hostility and frustration was reflected in this image.

That very little overt violence erupted from this Class directly can also be attributed to this trait of being unable to do anything of a physical nature, though they were very good talkers and still are – much to the chagrin of the Israeli Information Effort – and utterly charming to anyone who would spend the time to sit and have a cup of coffee with them which included many among the World's Press and Diplomatic Corps. They rather tolerated their new reduced circumstances for the time being in a derisory and sullen manner, confident that one day they would either see or contribute to a turn-around.

All members of the Upper Class were caught within the vice of the new tax structure where it could be applied. This was done wherever Israeli Presence was strongest, particularly within the Jerusalem Municipality in the form of property and income taxes and even taxes on rented property, which were hitherto unknown. Further out in the Territories themselves the application of taxes was less even but, even here, some inroads were made particularly as concerned cash transactions or Endowed Institutions where records were kept and on Public Utilities.

In Jordan previously there had been very few taxes of any kind and, where there were any, these were not collected in any consistent manner. The Government supported itself through its own investments and foreign aid; and so, likewise, Government Services were kept to a minimum. Roads on the whole were in very poor condition except for the main thoroughfares which were used to support military transportation. Often financed by U.S. A.I.D., they

therefore supported the Jordanian presence in the Area. But secondary roads had hardly been upgraded since Mandate Times when a fairly good highway system had been instituted. The Public School System, where it existed, was mediocre and inadequate and the Upper Classes sent their children to Private Schools. Religious Denominations, where possible, ministered to those that were left. Medical services too were hardly existent.

All these things depended on one's status as far as private income was concerned though prices were cheap. Even garbage was hardly ever picked up since there was very little garbage system of any kind and, therefore, the practice of throwing rubbish into empty fields was widespread. Even now, if one tours the outlying Districts of East Jerusalem, one can find rusted tin cans scattered around almost every residential enclave.

Often members of the Upper and Middle Classes simply refused to pay their taxes (the Lower Classes had no money with which to pay taxes in any case) and the Israeli Tax-Assessor was forcibly barred from the house. This was usually cloaked under a ferocious barrage of anti-Israeli invective. For their part, the Israelis seemed to have no real systematic approach to such confrontations and, besides bombarding an individual with written notices, only insisted on the collection of taxes when it did not result in a struggle. In instances like this, the Tax Assessor was usually content to go away and try again some six months later.

The Lower Classes, for their part, watched the spectacle of equal distribution of taxes with some relish taking it as another example of Israeli fair-handedness and egalitarianism. Besides, they enjoyed the new services and, since they generally had large families themselves and relatively low incomes, under the graduated Israeli tax structure they rarely paid anything themselves. Rather, as we have seen, the other way round. They enjoyed seeing

businessmen and hotel owners gouged very often of up to fifty per cent of their profits. Secretly, though they listened in respectful silence, they enjoyed hearing their employers complaining bitterly at the monstrous Israeli tax structure. This to the humble Arab mind seemed equitable. They were only disappointed when they saw the Israelis themselves acting in a venal manner they only thought their own Upper Classes capable of.

The Lower Classes simplistically identified everything modern and forward-looking with the Israeli Administration. Therefore, they would be disappointed when they saw the Upper Class owner of a Mercedes-Benz able to bribe a policeman out of the issuance of a traffic ticket. When the ticket was applied equitably regardless of rank they were pleased. On the Ramallah Highway, for instance, when cafe-sitters saw an Arab or an Israeli get a ticket for speeding (a section of road particularly well patrolled) without regard to station, not owning a car themselves, they nodded with approval. This was after all only what they had expected of Israel. Was not this why they had been beaten in several Wars? This was what Israel was all about. But when they heard that Customs Officials on the Bridges across the Jordan could be bribed to look the other way or at the Lebanese Border Check-Points would wave a UN vehicle through for a bottle of whiskey, they were disappointed and shook their heads in disbelief. This was not the Israel they had heard about.

The Upper Class however, the persons who usually did the bribing, reacted with triumph when successful. This was what they had always thought the Israelis were anyhow, contemptible. Though they themselves set the snares and derived the benefit, if they found one weak enough to accept while, publicly feigning an air of obsequiousness, privately they reacted with derision.

In the early days anyhow, the Upper Classes too were caught in the grip of rising prices and rising rents even more than the Lower

Classes. The Lower Classes, not being accustomed to any luxuries in any event, did not feel the hardships to the same extent as the Upper Classes did. Plus, as has already been pointed out, their rising wages and job opportunities more than compensated them for the more spartan state of affairs. Plus, many persons of the Middle and Upper Classes lived in rented housing (rented housing being relatively cheap before the Six-Day War).

This was not the case with the Lower Class who could not afford rented housing. These people particularly felt the crunch. Services had gone up – electricity had perhaps tripled or quadrupled since Jordanian days. Telephones were astronomical to possess when you could get one – and even more expensive to keep up (the Lower Classes did not possess telephones). Water prices tripled and quadrupled as did gas.

The list was endless: food prices, gasoline, kerosene, utensils, everything. The Israeli Luxury Tax on items the Upper Class had come to take for granted, viewing them as something of a status symbol, was ubiquitous: 2-300% on cars, 150% on television sets, phonographs, washing machines, space heaters, etc., etc. Once again, the Lower Classes, never having had these things, did not miss them and in the new wage structure were even in many cases for the first time able to buy them at least second-hand.

But what was perhaps even worse for the Upper Classes, who could not do their own work themselves – the Lower Classes often did their own work for themselves or worked in a kind of family or clan labor pool, much like the early Frontier Days in America – labor costs had soared when there was any available. As has already been noted, a good deal of the available labor had gone over into Israel to work. Why – mainly because the conditions were better. There were the numerous fringe benefits already enumerated, the pay was better; plus, the Israeli foreman was just less taxing. It was not the old-

style, Class-oriented labor which was really almost Medieval in character and where the crafts flourished. You worked for a wage. When the whistle blew, shoddy or good, finished or not, you went home.

Formerly you might have had someone standing over you every minute of the day until the work was done properly, i.e., to the exacting standards of a luxurious, if inert, Upper Class. When they could get workers, then they had to pay an Israeli-style wages in order to compete. But most of all they could not get them. The Arab worker simply preferred not to work for his old Class Superiors. He preferred the less exacting, if culturally alien, more impersonal work procedures of Israel.

Aside from the psychological factors involved, what one has here is really a Revolutionary Situation as far as work attitudes were concerned, and the effects of it could be seen in the drastically reduced standards for what could be considered an acceptable job. Should it be said, can it? The Arab worker felt like a man for the first time in his life. He was a mature and independent person and treated as such however much a cipher in the total scheme of modern, impersonal labor. It sounds absurd to say in a Western Context but something that was thrilling to the individual workman involved was that he even began taking off his shirt as the Israeli workman did – a thing unheard of in an Arab Environmental context any time previously.

To sum up: in the first few years of the Israeli Administration, the Upper Class saw its life-style and source of income continually under siege and threatened while the worker saw his wages rise constantly with those of his Israeli counterpart. The latter saw the former being taxed while he was paying next to nothing – in some cases, even receiving a large family subsidy courtesy of the Israeli Government. While the Upper Class saw their usefulness as productive

people called into question, the Lower Class saw something just the reverse. As a result, the former reacted to the situation and the imposts levied upon them with a grudging compliance bordering on malevolence. Their place in the social fabric as persons capable of earning a wage was being daily called into question. In short, their social status was being threatened and the basis on which their privilege rested, the ready availability of cheap labor, melted away.

It was, therefore, the Upper Classes that reacted to the Israeli presence with contempt and loathing bordering on outright hostility and, in a very real sense, subconscious Fear – something they had every reason to do – not the Lower. This was not the picture given out to the World Public Opinion Channels through the World's Press but rather the anguish of the privileged few of the Palestinian Elite – at least in Israel – was pictured as the anguish of the whole Palestinian People.

Unfortunately for Israel and for the Israeli image abroad, the Army did nothing to capitalize on this situation. Whether unconsciously or out of ignorance, they even cooperated with the former Upper Class. Perhaps they were relying on their previous training with the British whose successful Colonial Policy it was to deal through the local Native Elite to play down their presence and keep the lid on things. If they were, the desired effect was the same despite the relatively short-term advantages of the policy. Perhaps they simply felt more at ease and were flattered by their urbane and outwardly at least more congenial manners and company. Whatever the reason, the Army did nothing to exploit or encourage this unexpected windfall of the Israeli Presence on the Occupied Territories – namely, the sympathy or at least the nan-antagonism of large sections of the Lower Classes.

Of course, indirectly they made political capital out of it,

trumpeting their huge success in controlling local Terrorist activity but, if this exposition has in any way been successful, then this will be seen as a natural development of the forces at work beneath the surface of events. The Army did not encourage Class Struggle or even set one element of the population against the other by encouraging newly-formed labor movements or developing a new, more Lower Class-oriented leadership. Rather, its personnel cooperated with representatives of the former Upper Classes, people like Shaikh al-Jabari in Hebron and Anwar Nuseibah in Jerusalem, a representative of some of its richest families and himself an owner or part-owner of several Jerusalem hotels.

No one can deny that it was certainly more pleasant and at least more satisfying (many of the upper officers responsible for the administration of East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories were former Hebrew University Arabists) to sip coffee with a member of the Arab Intelligentsia and former Elite than to rub shoulders with his scruffy counterpart in the *Suk*; but no revolutionary transfer of power did or has developed on the heels of the social transformations just described. Instead, a state of stasis has developed, waiting on the outcome of the World's Political Negotiations and deepened by the adverse effects – from Israel's point-of-view – on the mental attitude of the average Arab in the Occupied Territories of the events of October-November, 1973.

There is also the factor, alluded to earlier, that Israelis from whatever background or training just do not on the whole seem to care about Arabs and are not particularly interested in distinguishing between the fine points of their Class Orientation or individual thinking. The policy adapted by the Army, dove-tailing nicely with the temporizing stance of the Government since the latter could never decide what it really wanted to do with the Occupied Territories, was no doubt glowingly successful from their

standpoint for the short-term but it is doubtful if any long-term either effects or benefits will accrue.

Another important aspect of the equation, when considering Class Orientations and Terrorist Activity among the People in the Occupied Territories, is the fact – undeniable to the unbiased observer – that almost all Terrorist Activity has taken place either outside Israel or has been initiated from outside of Israel. It might appear that what is being claimed here is that no Terrorist Activity exists among the Arab Lower Classes or that no Lower Class Arabs enlist in the PLO. This is patently untrue and is not being contended here.

What is being contended is that up until comparatively recently these persons came almost exclusively from people residing in the Refugee Camps – particularly Refugee Camps outside of the Borders of former Palestine – and, therefore, from people with very little knowledge or contact with Israel. These Camps can quite literally be described as hotbeds of PLO and Revolutionary Activity. Without them, very probably, the PLO could not thrive.

The Sabena Aircraft High-Jacking, the Lod Airport Massacre, the Tragedy at the Olympic Games in Munich, the Orly and Fulmicino attacks, the Athens machine-gunnings, and a host of other long-past and now forgotten incidents all took place either outside the Borders of Israel or at its very gates.

Since The *Yom Kippur* War these raids have struck deeper into Israel but still, on the whole, they have originated from and been carried out by people from outside of Israel, e.g., the Kiryat Shmoneh, Ma'alot, and Tel Aviv Beachfront massacres. Only within the last year really has there been any increase in what might be considered indigenous Terrorist Occurrences: knifings and shootings of tourists or soldiers on roads or in market places on the West Bank, *katyusha* rockets falling into WestJerusalem from emplacements near Beit Safafa, package bombs left on buses in Tel Aviv and

Netanya, explosions in military weapons manufacturing centers, the break-up of a cell of some thirty-three terrorists in Bethlehem and Hebron, and the Jerusalem/Zion Square Terrorist Bomb carnage. Of these last, many would no doubt still like to argue that most of them originated or were initiated from outside of Israel.

That most of these Terrorist Acts and all of the Terrorist Organizations originated in the Refugee Camps outside of Israel should not be at all surprising for it was only in these Camps that until recently the necessary Social Conditions existed for the enlistment of these kind of cadres and the successful breeding of a National Liberation Movement. In a very real sense, the Palestine Nation and with it the Palestine Liberation Organizations were bred in the Refugee Camps – first outside Israel of the pre-1967 borders and then outside of an expanded Israel including the Occupied Territories.

In Israel, at least until the last few years, the factors did not exist for a flourishing National Liberation Movement. To a certain extent, many of the Lower Class cadres necessary to sustain such a Movement in Israel had already achieved their Liberation – Liberation from a Feudal Elite and Class-Structured Society as they previously knew it. There is little impetus for further Liberation of a National Variety at present – except in romantic imagination – lest the former situation return again. On the other hand, the situation within the Camps in the Arab Host Countries – and formerly on the West Bank in Palestine and in the Gaza Strip – is an Arab Social Problem reflecting the inequalities of Arab Social Stratifications and Arab Social Disabilities and, as such, has nothing to do with Israel *per se*.

Certainly the frustrations developed over years and years of depersonalized living in these Camps presided over by one of the most depersonalized Of all organizations, the U.N., find their

expression in a virulent anti-Israelism and a lurid sense of hatred that satisfies itself in machine-gunning innocent crowds in air terminal waiting-rooms or touching off hand grenades in rooms full of helpless children. But Israel can only be considered the cause in the sense of being the catalyst that set vast multitudes of people in motion – both ways, Arab Jewish Refugees to Israel and Palestinian Arab Refugees to the Arab Countries. But the fact that these people are kept in Camps some thirty years after the original events that caused these dislocations and a whole new generation of people have grown up under these conditions without any tangible roots in Palestine at all, but only a dream of a certain imaginary reality, has to do with Arab Political Motivations and the inability and unwillingness of certain Arab Societies to absorb these people.

The 1970 strife in Jordan gave vivid testimony to the antagonism of the urban, largely Palestinian Arab to the Beduin Supporters of King Hussein and the present bloody strife in Lebanon shows the incapacity of that Country's Social System to absorb the hordes of Palestinians living on the fringes of its National Life for almost thirty years.

Kuwait is another example. One of the most opulent and flourishing of the newly-rich Arab Oil Kingdoms, it is considered – as is Jordan – to be almost half-populated by Palestinians. Though without these last, the thriving economy and social services of that Country would grind to a halt, yet they are forbidden to own land or to otherwise participate in the fabric of National Existence in order to keep them in a permanent state of impermanence.

The situation is repeated in almost every conservative Arab Country from Saudi Arabia to Libya – not to mention more progressive ones. The Arab Countries probably could not absorb these people even if they wanted to because of the present inequities of their social arrangements and because at core they are

Societies that have hardly emerged from the Feudal Middle Ages.

In addition to this, the callousness of one Arab to another on a personal social level, one class to the other – evidences of which can clearly be seen in the behavioral patterns of any Arab Country (Iraq, Syria, and even the West Bank of Palestine are excellent sampling grounds for this) – aggravates the problem and allows these generations of people to wallow in the hopeless existences of Refugee Camps, wards of the International Community for almost thirty years. This at a time when the combined Arab States probably control more currency reserves than any other similar block of Nations in the World.

It is not just the Arabs, but any independent observer will attest that many of what are often euphemistically referred to as "the Developing Nations", despite their Religious Affiliations, have just not developed the kinds of social consciousnesses that have come to be taken as the norm in Western Societies (and this is not a statement of congratulations to the West on their superiority; it is simply a statement of fact).

Can there be much dissenting opinion in characterizing the conditions in the Arab Refugee Camps as an "Arab Social Problem" in view of the factors, just discussed, in describing the situation on the West Bank and in Israeli-annexed Jerusalem? The problem in Israel vis-a-vis the disinherited Palestinians is to a certain extent the mirror-image of that in the Arab Countries – how to slow down and impede their integration into Israeli Society lest Israeli Society lose its characteristic "Israeli" flavor. This is the debate in the Israeli Press. There is little doubt that the Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza can be integrated; the problem is not – as in the Arab Countries – how to speed up that integration.

When discussing the lack of an Arab sense of social responsibility for one another, one is talking about Modern Urban and Semi-Urban

Society as it exists in the Arab World today – not about the Arab *Beduin* or Village Clan Structure, nor about Modern Nationalist sentiments which breed a certain sense of fellow-feeling. But the former has always been even in Classical Times the true complaint of the Desert Arab with regard to the dehumanization and degradation of his city counterpart.

The true loyalty of the average Arab is usually to Village, Clan, or Tribe – not to the more Johnny-come-lately distinctions of Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian. The Palestinian Problem too, when viewed in this context, could be seen as more of a "*cause celebre*" and not as a deep-rooted factor in the individual Arab make-up.

It is only within the context of this callousness towards and lack of concern for one another that one can understand the way Arabs treat their fellow Arabs: *Beduin* against Civilized or Settled Arab, Upper Class exploiting Lower as almost a non-existent species, the great gap between Rich and Poor in almost all Arab Countries – even the Oil-Rich ones despite their vast revenues and the very few measures taken to alleviate it – the actual lack of concern Iraqi has for Syrian, Lebanese for Palestinian, Egyptian for Libyan, and Algerian for Jordanian.

It is only within such a context that one can understand Upper Class Arabs on the West Bank being unable to find Arab Laborers to work for them when confronted with the newly-opened opportunities in Israel. Arab Laborers, despite cultural differences and admitted inequities in the Israeli Class System (no one doubts here that the Arabs are second or third-class citizens in Israel as, to a certain extent, are *Sephardi* Jews), were simply unwilling to work for their Arab Employers – given the choice.

The understanding of this process can delineate even further the antithesis the Arab Lower Classes feel towards their treatment by their Social Betters as something only a little higher than animals

– indeed, animals often receive better treatment. They knew the conditions and sort of treatment they could expect. I have had this opinion expressed many times over to me – one cannot run sociological polls among Lower Class Arabs; there simply would not be any results. On a preference scale Arabs would, first of all, probably prefer working for foreigners, i.e., UN Personnel, Embassy Staff, foreigners living in Israel, etc.; next, Israelis; and, last of all, their own native elite.

The fact that they often even preferred working for Jewish Foreigners or Israelis over certain categories of the first-mentioned group can only inspire wonder and is only attestable through personal observation. If they did – and I for one can attest to it – then this can only be attributed to the built-in equities and fair-dealing of the Israeli Social System in spite of itself and in spite of the antithesis many Israelis feel to Arabs personally.

One doesn't find anything like this antithesis among Lower Class Arabs to Israelis. If Israelis expressing such anti-Arab sentiments were to know this, it might give them some pause – but the communications gap between the two cultures is, on the whole, too vast to provide such knowledge. The usual Arab Lower Class feeling towards Israelis until very recently was a kind of naive, child-like trust.

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What has happened to change all this? First of all, there was the retrenchment of attitudes caused by events surrounding the setback of The *Yom Kippur* War. Though the Arab population in the Occupied Territories remained characteristically docile during the actual Confrontation, still the events themselves were unsettling. Those who were running pell-mell in the direction of adopting Israeli Life-Styles were given pause.

Then, too, the duration of the Israeli Presence in the Occupied

Territories – which was previously seen as being more or less permanent – was called into question in a very vivid manner. Perhaps they were not going to stay as long as was previously assumed and the piecemeal deterioration of the Israeli Position in the two years since in Disengagement and Separation of Forces Agreements has only served to confirm this impression.

The voices of their elders and the voices of their social betters began to nag at their ears. Perhaps the Israelis were not so invincible as they previously had seemed. Perhaps the Israeli Life-Style was not the only option and not even the best one. Perhaps there was something to be said for Native Arab Life-Styles after all.

Was it not an Arab Army that dislodged the Israelis from the Suez Canal and almost threw them off the Golan Heights? Were not the Arab Countries in the Arabian Peninsula, Kuwait, and Libya now the Richest Countries in the World and had they not brought all the Nations of the World to heel through imposing an Oil Embargo? Even in the military situation that had resulted in the wake of *The Yom Kippur War*, it was still not clear that the Arabs had been worsted – otherwise, why would the Israelis be retreating? Perhaps the Upper Classes had been right all along.

In any event, if any of these Territories ever went back to Arab Rule, anyone even suspected of harboring pro-Israeli sympathies – no less of cooperating with them willingly and even openly – would pay very dearly for it. It was time to take stock of oneself and concern oneself with the future, about one's children, one's family. It was time to see which way the wind was blowing before embracing the Israeli way of doing things any further.

Certainly any anti-Israeli sentiments expressed now would stand one later in good stead and could do one no harm. The future

presence of the Israelis in the Occupied Territories had been seriously called into doubt. What was going to take their place, whether a return to Jordan or an Israeli Puppet Regime or an actual Palestinian State was not at all clear. But the last-named was the theme most often heard in the Arab Press and emanating from the Capitols around the World and, with the events of the last two years, with Arabs flexing their political clout, Israel in grave economic and political danger, extreme political pressures mounting on Israel in both Europe and America; it was time to be more circumspect in one's actions if not as well in one's thought.

But the process of retrenchment we are talking about of on the part of the general Arab Mass was already well underway in the year and a half before the War actually broke out. What had happened to bring it about? For the most part it was the rampant inflation which hit the industrialized West around the beginning of the 1970's. This hit Israel too, a nation long accustomed to inflation, with a vengeance probably before its real effects were even being felt in the West and certainly before the inflationary spiral caused by The *Yom Kippur* War.

Around 1969, land and real estate prices began to rise in Israel at an astronomical rate. People originally thought this was the usual inflation that followed any War, that followed The Sinai Campaign of 1956 and The Independence War of 1948. The only problem with the present occurrence was that it did not stop. Prices for everything began to rise.

These price rises hit the West Bank even more drastically than they hit Israel itself, for the former had been accustomed to a more-or-less stable economy under the coddling of the Jordanian Regime and stable prices. To see the benefits of their new-found affluence denied them almost before they could begin to enjoy them

was almost too much for many for, at least, in Israel Proper the Government enforced certain restrictive price controls on basic commodities such as butter, bread, eggs, sugar, cheese, etc.

Immediately following The Six-Day War, even with the adjustments involved in the change-over to a new currency and the new statutory regulations, prices were considered much cheaper in the Occupied Territories by Israelis and Arabs alike than in Israel itself. Large flats were plentiful to come by and, by Israeli standards, extremely cheap to rent. Israelis could be seen everywhere, flocking to East Jerusalem and the Areas, seeking bargains. This received wide publicity in the World's Press and tourists coming to the Holy Land for the first time could see the newly-blossoming friendship between Arab and Jew. In retrospect, these perhaps could be viewed as 'the Happy Years.'

But after 1972, the staggering inflation that gripped Israel hit the West Bank even harder. In Israel, at least there were price controls to deal with certain commodities including rents in various types of rental housing. On the West Bank and in Gaza these controls, for the most part, did not apply or were not applied. In localities like East Jerusalem, where in theory they did apply, the responsible Israeli Authorities, lax as they had always been in collecting taxes, were even more lax in applying these controls which were unpopular with the merchants in any case.

This was when the good feeling towards Israel began to evaporate. It is the same with any disappointed child when he sees an admired image shattered. It was the same, as we have seen earlier, with regard to the Customs Inspector at the Allenby Bridge or the Police Officer who failed to give the appropriate traffic citation on the Jerusalem-Ramallah Highway. All staples, such as eggs, milk, butter, and bread, suddenly became more expensive in Israel-Annexed East Jerusalem than they were in West Jerusalem. Before the reverse

had been true. No attempt was made at enforcing any kind of price control whatsoever.

The old British Colonial Policy, inherited by the Israeli Army, evidently applied to the Jerusalem Municipality as well: let the Natives look after their own affairs. Whereas before one used to find Israelis coming to the Arab Side to look for bargains in terms of vegetables, fruit, or free-range, i.e., non-Kibbutz marketed, eggs; now Arabs were trying to get over to the *Mahane Yehuda* Market or one of the *Supersols* (Israeli Supermarkets) that were so plentiful on the Israeli Side.

But even in these last by the Spring of 1973 there were shortages in eggs and bread and, when available, they were often given out only sparingly to regular customers. Eggs, which used to sell in Israel for around 18 ag. apiece depending on the size (before the devaluations of 1974-75), began selling on the Arab side for 30-35 ag. apiece – almost double the Israeli price, when they were available. Arab vegetables, previously sought as bargains by Israelis because of their cheap prices and good quality, became very expensive.

Milk always did sell on the Arab side for 5 ag. or so more a packet than in Israel. But native Arab milk from places like Musa Alami's *Boy's Town* in Jericho began selling for almost double or triple the Israeli price. Of course, foreigners living on the Arab Side or upper-class Arabs, the only people who drank it, consoled themselves by pointing out contemptuously the difference in quality between it and Israeli milk.

Things like the price of chicken, always plentiful and cheap on the Arab side, began to double as well. But perhaps more serious than any of these rises were the rises touched off by the doubling of the price of kerosene, home heating fuel, in 1972 and 1973. This was before the rises occasioned by The *Yom Kippur* War and the Arab

Oil Embargo that followed it and does not even take into consideration the rises in the price of gasoline at the fuel pumps since most Lower Class Arabs do not own cars. Many do, however, own or lease taxis or commercial vehicles with the resultant hardships; and bus fares also fell within the framework of constantly soaring prices.

This unconscionable doubling of the price of kerosene in the two years before The *Yom Kippur* War by the Israeli Government hit the Arab Side of the old Green-Line like a thunderclap. The Israelis just do not use kerosene to anything like the degree that Lower Class Arabs do. The Government, thinking parochially as it was wont to do, said people in West Jerusalem would just have to put down their home-heating temperature to a certain degree. People in West Jerusalem, as it is, barely heat their apartment complexes – only allowing the furnaces to operate at certain specified hours during the day and at restricted temperatures. Of course, most of the other extensive Jewish Pockets of Population were in the more temperate Coastal Plains, the Negev Desert, the Emek, and the Sea of Galilee Regions.

But for the Arab Lower Class, kerosene is the mainstay of their housing arrangements. They use it far anything that has to do with heat: for heating stoves, cooking, and warming and boiling water. The Israelis generally use gas or electricity for two out of three of these things while the Arab Upper Classes are generally able to afford utensils to use gas at least for heating if not also for cooking, prices for which did not rise at least at that time anywhere near as drastically.

The steep rises in land prices and building materials also in 1972 and 1973 effectively priced the Lower Classes, even with their newly-acquired higher salaries, out of the housing market. Whereas in Israel the Government was forced to institute more extensive

housing programs on however meager a scale to aid young couples, slum dwellers, and new immigrants; in the Areas, nothing of any impact was done or probably could be done.

Just as an example of the effect of these problems in Israel proper, the problem of housing was always the bone of contention that stuck in the throat of the successful immigration and assimilation of Russian Jews and others. These factors only served to raise the position of the Arab Upper Classes once again, always the landowners in any event; and, while apartment rents doubled and tripled where they were available, still the position of the Upper Classes was enhanced. (After the Six-Day War, there was a kind of hiatus in building activity on the West Bank for the first two or three years until the situation clarified. Everyone expected there that the price of building would sooner or later come down. When it did not, people had begun building again.)

The Lower-Classes, for their part, often having families of nine or ten children, virtually lost the ability in the more complicated Israeli Environment to provide their older married sons with housing since the price of the average three-room flat in Jerusalem had climbed to well over \$30,000. All these processes, herein enumerated, have been intensified since The *Yom Kippur* War reversals and the 1974-75 devaluations.

The factors we are describing and the consequent retrenchment were aggravated by the almost callous unthinkingness of the Israeli Government then in power and the complete lack of understanding, or perhaps wish to understand, they displayed of the factors at work in the Occupied Territories operating for or against the interests of Israel. So convinced were some members of the last Government – notably people like Pinhas Sapir, Abba Eban, and, to a certain extent, even Mrs. Meir herself and people of similar political

posture very often referred to as "doves" or "liberals" in the World Press – that continued association with the West Bank in anything like the present day-to-day circumstances was basically detrimental to the interests of Israel and antithetical to the very concept of Zionism itself; they were simply not interested in what transpired on the West Bank whether for the good or whether for bad of the population there.

They did not need people like Henry Kissinger to come and tell them after The *Yom Kippur* War, nor the voices of the Assembled Nations of the World at the UN, to give back the Occupied Territories. It is no wonder that Mr. Kissinger was widely reported as saying after the collapse of his First Middle East Shuttle that he wished he had the old Israeli team of Mrs. Meir, Dayan, and Abba Eban back to work with. Who can blame him? At least two out of three of these persons had ideas similar to his own. They were quite prepared, even before the recent War, to give back as much of the Occupied Territories as was humanly possible – as probably were the majority of the People of Israel if an equitable, face-saving means of doing so could have been found. Nothing so inconsequential as the rising expectations of the Arab Lower Class, the social debt owed these people in the wake of introducing them to quite a different set of Class and Economic Circumstances, was even taken into consideration.

From the years 1970-1973, there was quite a good deal of enthusiasm for handing these people back to an economically and socially-reactionary Regime like King Hussein's Jordan. Because of the even graver security issues raised by The *Yom Kippur* War itself, very little is heard in this vein these days and now the talk runs more towards "Confederation" which incorporates aspects of the well-known "Allon Plan" of yesterday's parlance with modifications. Nothing about the repercussions such a move would

have had on the average Arab working man was ever heard. After all, what does Israel have to do with the Social Problems of the Arabs? Let the Arabs handle their own Social Affairs. Am I my brother's keeper? Israel has enough of its own Social Problems to deal with. Such callousness reaps its own rewards.

A situation all too familiar to the Lower Class town-worker, the villager, the *fellah*, the mass of disenfranchised poor, began to rear its head once again: the Rich were getting richer and the Poor were getting poorer. In the first five years after The Six-Day War, things seemed to be moving in the reverse of this direction. Then the economic managers in Israel decided that the only way to deflate a dangerously-overheated economy was to dry up some of the free cash floating around. Since inflation was then becoming a World-wide curse, why should Israelis object to it or think it should not transpire here?

In this attitude, the present Government is not too different from the last despite the new taxation system being introduced. Yehoshua Rabinowitz, Pinhas Sapir's successor at the Finance Ministry, was simply his right-hand man in the Party Circles in Tel Aviv and Chaim Bar-Lev, another Minister who owes his meteoric rise to Pinhas Sapir, is still Minister of Commerce and Industry. The way to dry up this excess capital in the hands of the general public was not to tax those segments of the population which were earning too much and, in most cases, were getting away without paying their fair share of the tax burden anyhow.

Few people in the World realize that since 1948 Israel has already developed a substantial number of millionaires – this in a Country with supposedly the highest tax burden in the World. Numerous people around and associated with the late Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir, have already been indicted and convicted of financial fraud and tax evasion. Associates of his have been involved in the *Netivei-Neft*

scandal, the *Autocars* collapse and, more recently, *The Israel Corporation* embezzlements; and yet, until his recent death, this person was still Head of the Jewish Agency and in charge of the World-wide fund-raising efforts of the Israeli Government.

The above-mentioned remedy would have provided for, in effect, a further redistribution of wealth downwards and given the Lower Classes even greater purchasing power not less; but, according to the logic of the Finance Ministry, this would have dampened down the economy too much and resulted in less of a free enterprise incentive which after all was what everyone owed their jobs to anyhow. The correct course to follow was to let prices rise until they found their own natural equilibrium which, of course, wiped out by definition any new-found plenty the Lower Classes might have enjoyed. Before the trauma of the Last War, the Economic Czars were even beginning to talk in terms of removing whatever price controls were left and finally arriving at the desired free market Economy.

Prices have been rising ever since. This process might be all well and good for a docile, well-organized Israel Population used to economic ups and downs, recessions, and bursts of economic overheating. It was explosive for an Arab Lower Class just emerging from a Feudal Society and the economic Middle Ages. All price rises on the Israeli Side of the old Green-Line have caused economic havoc on the Arab and by a factor far out of proportion to what would have otherwise seemed apparent to the responsible Israeli Authorities. These are the real factors at work among the Arab Population in the Occupied Territories.

Grumbling at the high cost of living, which wipes away any advantages being associated with Israel brings, is now widespread. It comes from the Lower Classes too, who used to be foremost – if for the most part silent – among the supporters of the unification of the two populations, and began in the year preceding *The Yom*

Kippur War. This discontent is reinforced by the wild tales told concerning Arab living standards in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in the wake of the successful Oil Embargoes of 1974. Heads are being shaken in a dubious manner expressing a futility previously all too well-known.

The Upper Classes are not complaining – at least no longer – not at the present configuration of things. They are laughing to themselves like the cat who has just swallowed the goldfish. If Terrorism is being reborn as an internal phenomenon and not just something originating from outside Israel's Borders, as the present rash of incidents seems to confirm; then the raising of legitimate Lower Class aspirations in the Occupied Territories for a better standard-of-living and a fairer shake in the scheme of things – and their subsequent frustration – will be the real reason. The sea is being refilled for the Guerrilla-Fish to swim in.

The real disillusionment many Lower Class Arabs are beginning to feel is all the keener because of their previous enthusiasm and will be the real factor in undermining their willingness to cooperate and live in peace under an Israeli Administration, not *Fatah* or its wild pretenses of liberation. Few people believe this, even for a moment, knowing the Class Orientation of much of its Leadership, cognizant of the Upper Class Arabs and Conservative Oil Regimes that support it.

Palestinian Nationalism was from its inception a Movement representing the interests of the Palestinian Elite against other surrounding Pan-Arab Forces and, in so far as the PLO though bred in the Refugee Camps is a continuation of this, it too will sooner or later display the Class Orientation of a Hussein, the Mufti of Jerusalem in the years between the World Wars. Even in the days of T. E. Lawrence, the Lower Classes were never really part of it, never feeling particularly Palestinian in contradistinction to being

Arabs except when they suffered the degradation of the Refugee Camps at the hands primarily of their own Arab Confreres. Those who never really experienced the humiliation of the Refugee Camps, as the Arabs in the Occupied Territories did, not become very ardent Palestinians.

What can the Israeli Government do about this problem now? Probably very little. For a start, it would mean re-evaluating their whole previous mental attitude towards the Arabs which is probably too much for any Society to be asked to do in a thoroughgoing manner. The intangible factor of "not really liking Arabs", already referred to several times above in this article, and its consequence of not really caring what happens to them would have to be reversed.

The sympathy that developed among the Lower Classes in the Occupied Territories for Israel was not really something that happened by calculation but an unexpected spin-off of the Social Situation that sprung up. In the same manner, the more recent retrenchment that occurred in this sympathy also went unnoticed and, therefore, no steps were taken to deal with it – as it was not understood from its outset or at its core.

For a start, though, the new price controls which have come into effect under the New Government on the heels of the recent devaluations should be enforced just as vigorously in East Jerusalem – and the Occupied Territories if possible – as they are in Israel. There should be no second-class citizens in Israel or under its Administration. Not only would this be a salutary Social Principle in Israel, it would also go a long way towards restoring Arab confidence in the equitableness of the Israeli Regime.

All venal officials should be rooted out ruthlessly. In a Country as venal as Israel, where even flats under the supervision of the Development Authorities are at the command of and open to purchase by various nameless Executive and Sub-Executive Officials, this is

probably again an impossibility in the present arrangement of things.

What perhaps is happening is that the Lower Class Arabs are just getting a taste of what the real Israel is like. In their cynicism, the Upper Classes never had any doubt of it. Not only should any Laws on the Books be enforced rigidly for all citizens presently under the Administration of the Israeli Government, but these Laws should be extended – whether in violation of International Law or not – to the Un-annexed Territories and enforced just as stringently there. If nothing else, such steps would at least revive the tarnished reputation for fairness the Israelis previously enjoyed especially among, of all peoples, their previous adversaries – the Arabs. In a curious way, this image of the Israelis has been linked in the Arab Mind with their success in winning wars for how else could they have been so successful?

In addition to this, the fate of the Populations on the West Bank and in Gaza should not just be considered a political football to be kicked around according to the needs of any present accommodation. This quite obviously undermines Israeli prestige in the Occupied Territories just as much as did The *Yom Kippur* War when the Israelis were seen not to be as invincible as was previously thought.

It is quite possible that the damage done by the last-mentioned event will never be recouped; but, as long as uncertainty bedevils the political status of the Occupied Territories and there seems to be a very good chance that the future Political Set-Up will not be the same as the present, then there is no incentive whatsoever for persons or groups of persons to participate in the Society.

The situation should have been seen and can still be seen in terms of its long-term effects. Nobody can predict what kind of Political Movement will emerge from an Arab Population living and working in

harmony with Israel twenty years from now, just as no one could have predicted twenty years ago that we would be in the present situation with the Land of Palestine once more a unified whole.

No effort was ever made under Golda Meir's Government or the Army Administration that reflected it to harness or even encourage any of this pro-Israel sentiment among the Arab Lower Classes on behalf of future peaceful co-existence with Israel and between the two Societies. Not only was it not encouraged, it was not even recognized, and the Military Authorities went on cooperating with the Arab Upper Class as if it was the only existing Political Force.

In reality, Israel is already the Bi-National State that the PLO has always talked so loosely about. With an Arab Minority of well over a million people, it has already become that *De Facto* State – only it is not called "Palestine". It is called "Israel". The thing that needed to be done was that the interests and economic well-being of this vast Arab Minority should have been given the serious and egalitarian attention it merited (the same might be said for certain other ethnic and minority problems in Israel Proper).

The problem was that the Israeli Government, then in power, suffered from a *Shtetl* Mentality and, remembering the days of the old Palestinian *Yishuv* with sentimental attachment, wanted to be rid of these vast reserves of Arab Population – not provide for them. They had no real quarrel with International Public Opinion, nor for that matter the PLO itself on this score.

It remains to be seen what will be the direction finally adopted by the new Israeli Government of Itzhak Rabin – in reality, the first real Native-born Government, the first *Sabra* Regime. Either a new concern for the legitimate aspirations of the downtrodden and Lower Class Arabs within the total Israeli Social Framework is evinced or the present Terrorism, now rearing its head and finding a groundswell of support among the bewildered Arab Mass, could become

endemic in a way not seen since Mandate Times.